Abatement Technology Search

Event Date: 1 November 2017

Speaker: Alain Nimubona, University of Waterloo

Time: 4.15 PM

Location: Strathclyde Business School, Cathedral Wing, CW507b

Abstract:

We develop a three-stage model of abatement technology search, adoption, and deployment.  Using this model, which draws on search theory tools more frequently used in labour and monetary economics, we compare market-based and command-and-control pollution control instruments with respect to the incentives each provides for abatement technology search and adoption, expected emissions reductions, and expected compliance costs. We show that the polluting firm always has more incentives to search for and adopt a more efficient abatement technology under either an emissions tax or a tradeable permit system than under an equivalently stringent emissions standard. We also show that while expected incentives for innovation are comparable under emissions taxes and tradeable permit regimes, the likelihood for total future compliance costs to be reduced after an increase in the stringency of environmental policy - the so-called Porter hypothesis - is higher with a tradeable permit regime.

Published: 25 October 2017