Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Colin Jennings
Author-Name-First: Colin
Author-Name-Last: Jennings
Author-Email: colin.jennings@strath.ac.uk
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde
Author-Name: Hein  Roelfsema
Author-Name-First: Hein 
Author-Name-Last: Roelfsema
Author-Workplace-Name: Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University
Title: Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership
Abstract: This article analyses negative externalities that policy makers
in one region or group may impose upon the citizens of neighbouring regions
or groups.  These externalities may be material, but they may also be psychological
(in the form of envy).  The latter form of externality may arise from the production
of "conspicuous" public goods.  As a result, decentralized provision of conspicuous
public goods may be too high.  Potentially, a centralized legislature may internalize
negative externalities.  However, in a model with strategic delegation we argue that
the median voter in each jurisdiction may anticipate a reduction in local public goods
supply and delegates to a policymaker who cares more for public goods than she does herself.
This last effect mitigates the expected benefits of policy centralization.  The authors'
theory is then applied to the setting of civil conflict, where they discuss electoral outcomes
in Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia before and after significant institutional changes which
affected the degree of centralization.  These case studies provide support for the authors'
theoretical predictions.
Length: 28 pages
Creation-Date: 2008-03
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: http://www.strath.ac.uk/media/1newwebsite/departmentsubject/economics/research/researchdiscussionpapers/2008/media_101946_en.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Number: 0803
Classification-JEL: D72,D74,H77
Keywords: conflict,federalism,strategic delegation
Handle: RePEc:str:wpaper:0803